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Education and Attitudes in Pakistan
Understanding Perceptions of Terrorism

Summary

- Pakistan’s official education system does not equip students to counter the prevailing, problematic narratives in society and the media in any way. Instead it both creates and propagates them.
- Pakistan studies textbooks forge an identity exclusively based on Islam and derived in opposition to India. The United States, mentioned sparingly, is portrayed as having betrayed Pakistan at key points in its history.
- Textbooks are memorized verbatim and class sessions do not permit questions from the students, teachers’ presentation of evidence, or discussion of alternative sources.
- A common Pakistani narrative of terrorism pins the blame on the United States and India. Explanations range from conspiracy theories to justifications of militant action as retaliation for U.S. policies.
- A second narrative interprets the militants’ cause as primarily religious and supports it on this basis.
- Pakistan needs curriculum reform to follow an international-level curriculum that incorporates rigorous analysis and critical thinking and to create tolerant and analytical global citizens.
- Official textbooks need both to be reimagined to include a full view of history and to be authored by international scholars.
- In addition, the government needs to find a way to halt the circulation of terrorist narratives from both mainstream media and madrassas.

Introduction

This report aims to understand the roots of an array of intolerant, biased, and—in some cases—radical attitudes in the Pakistani populace, including anti-Americanism, hatred of India.
The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, which does not advocate specific policy positions.

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Background

It is conventional wisdom that more education is correlated with “better” attitudes, such as greater tolerance and lower support for terror groups. As an example, Punjab’s chief minister, Shahbaz Sharif, recently stated that more education “will comprehensively defeat terrorism and militancy.”5 Researchers have used data and evidence across multiple contexts to show that this notion does not stack up: The quantity of an individual’s education, measured in years of schooling, appears to be unrelated to his or her support for terror groups and terrorism, measured using public opinion survey responses.6

But such quantitative research misses a good look inside the black box of schooling, at how the quality of schooling and what you learn affect attitudes. One aspect of this is learning outcomes—how well students actually learn and retain what is taught in schools, as measured in test scores—and another is the content of the curriculum and teaching. This report focuses on content rather than on learning outcomes. Though it is clear that learning outcomes fare poorly in Pakistan, and one can argue that poor learning directly affects attitudes as well.7

Evidence is accumulating globally on the effect of education content on attitudes. A new study in China on its recent curriculum reform, for example, shows that changes in the curriculum causally affected attitudes in the direction the government desired. The phased reform made it clear that students who were exposed to the new and Hindus, intolerance of minorities, and some sympathy for militant groups. Underlying such attitudes are intolerance, prejudice, hate, and bigotry, along with a misguided notion of the so-called enemy—views that are likely the product of long-term state policy, global trends, and individual proclivities. This report examines the role of Pakistan’s official education system relative to other possible influences, such as the home and the media, in contributing to such attitudes. It is based on a curriculum and textbook study and fieldwork in high schools in Punjab from the fall of 2013 to the summer of 2014.1

In the spring of 2014, 59 percent of respondents to the annual Pew Global Attitudes poll in Pakistan had an unfavorable view of the United States.2 At the same time, few actually reported having favorable views of the Taliban and al-Qaeda—8 percent and 12 percent, respectively—even before the Taliban’s Peshawar school attack that rattled the country in December 2014.3 Asked to choose, however, 51 percent stated that India was the greatest threat to the country, relative to the 25 percent who identified the Taliban and the 2 percent who named al-Qaeda, reflecting a national narrative that even in 2014 was more wary of India than of terrorist groups.4

Overt expressions of sympathy for the Taliban in polls are limited in Pakistan and have decreased sharply since the spring of 2008, when the favorability statistic stood at 27 percent. Why do Pakistanis continue to hold a skewed assessment of the Taliban threat to their country? What narratives underlie their attitudes toward the Taliban, the United States, India, and religious minorities?

This report illustrates some common narratives of Pakistani high school students and teachers on these issues and traces the roots of these narratives to the education system as compared to other sources. Pakistan’s current education system is problematic partly because it drives unhealthy narratives, but also because it does not equip students to counter societal and media narratives, conspiracy theories, or terrorist narratives in any way. Students are never taught how to assess and question sources of information and thus are easily swayed by narratives that are, in many cases, misguided.

Evidence is accumulating globally on the effect of education content on attitudes. A new study in China on its recent curriculum reform, for example, shows that changes in the curriculum causally affected attitudes in the direction the government desired. The phased implementation of the reform made it clear that students who were exposed to the new
curriculum were statistically significantly more likely to view China’s political system as
democratic, to trust government officials, and to view an unconstrained market economy
with skepticism.\textsuperscript{8}

Narratives on India and Hindus are a large part of the Pakistani curriculum, which was
redesigned in the late 1970s and early 1980s to foster a nationalism derived in opposition
to India. Student attitudes on India today are largely in line with the textbook narratives.
Textbooks and the schools sketch the skeleton of views on the United States, which the
media and societal narratives then fill in. Views on terrorism today derive largely from soci-
etal narratives and the media, as well as from extremist madrassas, but the curriculum also
encourages conspiracy theories.

Since the 1980s, historians and scholars have criticized Pakistan’s official curriculum and
textbooks (especially English and Urdu language textbooks, and both Islamic and Pakistan
studies), have documented biases and historical errors in them, and have argued that the
books promote intolerance and bigotry.\textsuperscript{9} Most recently, a study by prominent scholar A. H.
Nayyar examining the 2006 curriculum reform and new textbooks concluded that the reform
was a “missed opportunity” and that the new curriculum continues to violate Pakistan’s
constitution by forcibly teaching Islamic teachings to non-Muslim students (in core subjects,
including Pakistan studies, English, and Urdu), and that historical errors, distortions, and
biases persist in Pakistan studies textbooks.\textsuperscript{10}

Why are misguided, bigoted, or intolerant views problematic? The vast majority of
those who hold such views will not turn toward violent extremism. In Pakistan, however,
these views exist in conjunction with increasing terrorism, sectarian violence, and vio-
ience against minorities. This violence does not often result in large public protests (with
notable exceptions, of course) or levels of public outrage comparable with, say, the release
of a movie about the Prophet Muhammad. A disturbing rise in mob violence against reli-
gious minorities is also evident in vigilante justice for alleged blasphemy cases—so even
civilian bigotry can turn violent.\textsuperscript{11} Finally, the most extreme or radical attitudes, even
when not violent themselves, can create an enabling environment for militants, who need
shelter and operational, logistical, and financial support from sympathizers to survive in
any context.

In addition, government action against violent actors is partly driven by civilian demand
for such action. In Pakistan, this demand has long been muted because of intolerant and
bigoted narratives, though the events of 2014—the Karachi airport attack in June, the
Peshawar school attack in December—changed the situation. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
held off on military action against the Taliban for months with the aim of pursuing talks
with them, partly because of public support for the talks.

\textbf{Methodology}

This report focuses on Pakistan studies in grades 9 and 10. The course covers the country’s
history, politics, economy, and geography and is a core subject on the grade 10 matricula-
tion examination (Matric), a provincial exam required for graduation from both government
high schools and private high schools that follow the government curriculum.\textsuperscript{12} The gross
enrollment ratio at the Matric stage is approximately 57 percent, according to the 2013–14
Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey.\textsuperscript{13} Grades 9 and 10 were chosen
because students are approximately fourteen to fifteen years old and mature enough to
have views on these topics, but have not yet dropped out—as many do—following the
Matric examination.

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and textbooks, have documented biases and historical errors in them, and have argued that
the books promote intolerance and bigotry.}
The study consisted of a textbook review across three of the four provinces in Pakistan—Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), excluding Balochistan—and field visits to twenty-three schools in Punjab. The field visits involved student focus groups, one-on-one teacher interviews, and attending Pakistan studies classes. Interviews were open-ended, unlike conventional public opinion surveys. This narrative approach is useful because it yields a detailed exposition of the attitudes and helps identify what drives them. This report is novel in examining the views of students when they are in their learning environment, as opposed to later in life, so that the impact of schooling can be more clearly traced.

The focus on the Lahore and Sheikhupura districts in northeastern Punjab (including the most rural and poorest parts of these districts) was mainly in response to security concerns about conducting research elsewhere. The population of the Lahore metropolitan area was estimated at 9.2 million as of July 2014, and of the Sheikhupura metropolitan area at 3 million as of 2013. Caution should be exercised in extrapolating the results from these two districts to the rest of the country, however. Both districts are more urban, prosperous, and connected on various dimensions—to the media, to the rest of Pakistan, and so on—than other parts of the country, though these factors can affect attitudes in either direction. Additionally, these two districts had not been the target of major terrorist violence in the years immediately preceding the interviews (despite attacks, especially between 2008 and 2010 in Lahore and again in November 2014 at the Wagah border) and may have a higher tolerance for terrorist groups than other parts of the country that have suffered violence more recently.

This study examined both government and private schools following the official government curriculum in grades 9 and 10. School visits and field interviews were undertaken between October 2013 and June 2014. Because the curriculum does not vary across schools within a province, no definitive causal effect of curriculum on attitudes can be identified. However, how the content from the curriculum and the school comes through in attitudes can be traced, as can whether varied teaching quality and family backgrounds affect attitudes. Conclusions can therefore be drawn about the role of schooling versus that of the home, the media, and society.

Direct field observation was first piloted in three schools, selected randomly from among all government and private schools registered with the Lahore Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education (BISE). In the main study, twelve schools in Lahore and its surrounding villages and four schools in Sheikhupura and its surrounding villages were randomly selected from among BISE-registered schools.

In the next phase, four schools were selected nonrandomly to provide a contrast to the main set by purposefully choosing schools that varied on some dimensions other than the fixed official curriculum. Two major elements varied. One was teaching quality: a liberal nonprofit school that invests heavily in teacher training, a set of low-cost private schools that receive direction in teaching methods from an elite network of schools, and an elite private school were selected. The other was family background. As a result, exposure to the media was also varied in that more affluent families have greater media exposure.

The schools selected varied greatly in size, ranging from two hundred to three hundred students to more than two thousand students, the average school size hovering around a thousand students. The government schools generally tend to be larger and more overcrowded than private schools; rural schools tend to be smaller than urban schools. The school student-to-teacher ratio number also varies quite a bit, the average hovering at about thirty students.

In each school visited, one Pakistan studies teacher was interviewed on a one-on-one basis, and a focus group was held with six to ten grade 9 or grade 10 students led by the author or a research assistant.
Curriculum Development and Reform

The structure of the curriculum in its current form was introduced during General Zia ul Haq’s military dictatorship in the 1980s. Pakistan studies was made a compulsory subject for all degree students, including medicine and engineering professional degrees, in 1981. Also in 1981 the University Grants Commission issued the following guiding directive to Pakistan studies textbook authors:

- to demonstrate that the basis of Pakistan is not to be founded in racial, linguistic, or geographical factors, but, rather, in the shared experience of a common religion. To get students to know and appreciate the Ideology of Pakistan, and to popularize it with slogans. To guide students towards the ultimate goal of Pakistan—the creation of a completely Islamized State.

This new policy represented a break from the past; the textbooks of the 1950s and 1960s were “incomparably more liberal” relative to the books written in the 1980s and included discussions of Hindu empires in the subcontinent, in contrast to the new books, which began with the arrival of Muslims in the subcontinent. The ideology of Pakistan, which is defined as equivalent to Islam, was introduced into and became a focal concept for Pakistan studies books only after 1977.

In response to mounting criticism of biases in the curriculum, then president General Pervez Musharraf set a curriculum reform process in motion in 2004 that culminated in the revised National Curriculum of 2006. Historically, responsibility for writing and distributing textbooks according to the federal curriculum fell to provincial textbook boards, which were required to secure approval by the Federal Ministry of Education (Curriculum Wing). The 2007 National Textbooks and Learning Materials Policy took away writing responsibility from the textbook boards and mandated that the official textbook be chosen as the result of a competition between private publishers, which would submit textbooks to the provincial governments.

The eighteenth amendment to Pakistan’s constitution, passed in 2010, handed over curriculum responsibility to the provinces, and new curriculum authorities were formed in each of them. In practice, the provinces are still by and large following federal curriculum guidelines and have yet to write their own curriculum documents, though they certainly have taken leeway in their adaptations or interpretations of the curriculum.

The writing of new textbooks using the 2006 curriculum has been staggered. Punjab, Balochistan, and KPK introduced books following the 2006 curriculum for Pakistan studies for grades 9 and 10 in the 2012–13 school year; this study analyzes the content of the new Punjab and KPK textbooks, as well as that of those from Sindh and Punjab, which follow the pre-2006 curriculum. Sindh has not followed the 2006 curriculum as of summer 2013 for Pakistan studies for secondary classes (grades 9 and 10), and its pre-2006 book is still being used in high schools.

Ultimately, the 2006 curriculum reform has brought about marginal improvements but has failed at any real change. This is unsurprising, given that the curriculum is a direct product of state policy and a narrative that justifies the existence of Pakistan with respect to India. The aims of the reform the Ministry of Education outlined seem to have been narrow to begin with—not taking on or altering the current narrative, but instead simply aiming to remove problems—and appear to have been further diluted in the conversion of the curriculum to the textbooks.

Textbook authors and private publishers are producing textbooks more biased than the curriculum guidelines. Insofar as many of them were likely products of the old curriculum, this is unsurprising. The official textbook review committees (part of the new provincial curriculum authorities) do not help either, in that they reject the more tolerant submissions. For
example, the Oxford University Press in Pakistan submitted textbooks to a competition in Punjab but was asked by the review committee to reintroduce the word “jihad,” even though the curriculum documents do not ask to write about it. In addition, the teaching method goals of the reform, such as reducing rote memorization, seem to have been lost along the way. Teachers still ask students to memorize and examiners still test it, ensuring that the textbooks remain critical, for the exam is based entirely on them.

In some places where improvements have been made, political factors are already undoing them. Following revisions to KPK textbooks during the liberal Awami National Party’s regime, the conservative Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf party has come into power in KPK and reversed many of the changes made (partly under pressure from its coalition partner, the Islamist party Jamaat-e-Islami), such as reintroducing mentions of jihad.

Textbook Review

Pakistan studies textbooks in English are a direct translation of Urdu textbooks, typically the language in which they are developed. The textbooks generally are poor quality in regard to language and grammatical errors, and more significantly and seriously in regard to substance. They are thin volumes that tend to focus more on historical events and dates, not on explanations. Many subjective statements are made without ascribing any basis or justification or source and tend to be entirely one-sided, in favor of Muslims and Pakistan.

Each province in Pakistan has one official textbook for Pakistan studies for each grade for all government schools. Students in private schools that follow the official matriculation curriculum also study the designated government textbook. The 2013–14 Punjab grades 9 and 10 Pakistan studies textbooks (one for each grade) are currently being used across the province and were in use in the schools visited in Punjab. They were written by private publishers and were selected through a competition run by the Punjab Education Department. Sindh’s official Pakistan studies secondary school textbook (one book for both grades) for the 2013–14 school year continues to be based on the old, pre-2006 curriculum and was written by the Sindh Textbook Board. The KPK counterpart volume for grade 9 for the 2013–14 school year followed the 2006 curriculum reform and was written by the KPK Textbook Board (though, in keeping with the 2007 learning materials policy, a private publisher should have written it).

Pakistani Identity

All Pakistan studies textbooks begin with a chapter on the Pakistan ideology, which is equated entirely with Islam and is considered all-important, something that needs to be defended and held on to at all costs. Most textbooks mention the pillars of Islam in that first chapter, which is problematic because it excludes non-Muslims from the Pakistani identity and forces them to study Islam. Islam features heavily in the old textbooks—in the 2002 Punjab textbook, Islam is mentioned 255 times in a thin volume. Jihad also features in the first chapter, in the discussion on the pillars of Islam:

*Besides Haj, Jihad [sic] also has great significance. Jihad means that financial and physical sacrifice which is made for the protection and promotion of Islam. Jihad not only means to fight against the enemies of Islam but also to make a struggle for the promotion and enforcement of Islamic teachings, keeping one’s desires and wants under the orders of Allah and uttering words of truth before a tyrant ruler.*

*26*
Mentions of jihad have decreased significantly in the new textbooks following the 2006 reform but have not been eliminated. Pakistan’s identity continues to be defined in terms of Islam, to the exclusion of other religions. Toward the beginning of the book, all the textbooks talk about the principle of no discrimination—on the basis of caste, race, color, language, wealth—but none other than KPK’s mention religion at that stage.

India and Hindus

The second chapter in the textbooks typically covers the creation of Pakistan, which is generally explained with references to the conspiring of Hindus and the British against Muslims, who are depicted as victims. The description of events is relentlessly one-sided. In the latest Punjab textbooks (post-reform), the word “conspiracy” is used frequently, especially in reference to Hindus pre-1947 and India post-1947. India is described as “cunning,” considered to put obstacles in Pakistan’s path, whether through the dispute over water between the two countries or in the division of assets at Partition, and especially through India’s role in 1971, in the separation of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. The “negative role of Hindu teachers” in East Pakistan is highlighted.

The Punjab and Sindh textbooks based on the old curriculum are more negative. The old Punjab textbook uses words such as “hostile”, “biased”, “destroy”, “deprive”, “ruin”, and “hatred” for Hindus’ attitude toward Muslims pre-Partition and India’s attitude toward Pakistan post-Partition, along with phrases such as “evil collusion between the Congress [party] and the British” and the “machinations of the Congress [party].” The current Sindh textbook, also based on the pre-2006 curriculum, is similarly biased. For example, on Syed Ahmed Shaheed Barelvi (an important religious, political, and military figure from the early nineteenth century) fighting against the Sikhs, the book states, “His struggle was against the evil forces in the subcontinent.” Barelvi is said to have preached “jihad because it was not possible to get freedom from evil force without armed struggle.”

The West and the United States

The United States is mentioned only a handful of times in the textbooks. The West is generally considered to have “two-face[d]” characters, and the United States in particular is considered to have betrayed Pakistan historically. A few instances are mentioned in this context. The first is Bangladesh’s creation, which is asserted to have been the work of a “secret agreement of big powers.” The second describes the United States as having blocked and punished Pakistan’s nuclear program and nuclear tests (of which the country and its textbooks are exceedingly proud) while turning a blind eye to India’s program. U.S. aid is acknowledged but its benefits are not, even in the latest Punjab textbook: “In these 10 years, America has given loan[s] of billions of dollars to Pakistan. However, it has never given aid for any big project of long-lasting economic and defense benefits to Pakistan.”

The books make it clear that Pakistan’s real loyalties lie with the Islamic world or the Muslim millat, and that the relationship with the West is mainly strategic and economic:

The main objective of Pakistan’s foreign policy is to protect the ideological borders of Pakistan...It can protect its ideology only by establishing better relations with the Islamic countries...The main reason for close contacts with the western countries is economic aid which made Pakistan closer to America and the western world.

In the old Punjab textbook, the United States was mentioned neutrally, in terms of trade or of its role on the Security Council; the newer textbooks are somewhat more negative. The latest KPK textbook also invokes the secret behind-the-scenes influence of the United States in terms of the separation of East and West Pakistan: “Taking advantage of the
internal political situation of Pakistan the then superior powers (Soviet Union and America) used to interfere in east Pakistan through different means...The process of separation of east Pakistan was secretly supported by America.”

This sets up a framework for blaming Pakistan's current problems on the United States as well.

The old Punjab textbook is very negative about Jewish people, describing them when articulating Pakistan's support for the Palestinian cause as “the wicked Jews [who] put a portion of Masjid-e-Aqsa on fire to demolish it.” This phrase was removed with the 2006 curriculum reform.

All is not negative, however, even in the old books; the old Punjab book, for example, ends on a positive and peaceful note:

As an Islamic country, Pakistan stands for international cooperation and peace. Islam teaches us peace and amity and discourages aggression. Although Islam allows to raise arms in self defence yet it strictly prohibits domination or persecution of people through military force. Pakistan has been taking necessary steps to promote international brotherhood and peace on the basis of these Islamic principles.

Terrorism

Terrorism is not mentioned in any of the textbooks written before the 2006 curriculum reform, which is understandable, given that Pakistan's security situation has worsened considerably since 2007. But even in the latest Punjab textbook, written in 2012, terrorism and extremism are mentioned only a couple of times, in the chapter on world affairs. First is the statement “Pakistan supported America in the Afghan war but as a consequence Pakistan itself is facing terrorism,” which lays the entire blame for terrorism in Pakistan on the alliance with the United States in Afghanistan after 2001. Second is a statement that praises Pakistan's counterterrorism efforts: “Pakistan is playing a very effective role against terrorism and extremism in the world.” Pakistan's efforts to counter terrorism have largely been unsuccessful and ineffective within the country, and tens of thousands of Pakistanis have become its victims, so this statement obfuscates reality. It would be worthwhile to have a real conversation about the issue of terrorism in the textbooks.

Classroom Observation

Variation in schooling occurs in the medium of instruction, the quality of teacher training and teaching in the classroom, students’ discussions with their teachers outside the classroom, students’ discussions with fellow students outside the classroom, and school-specific policies on posting daily news headlines on bulletin boards or reading them in the school assemblies. The average size of classes observed for this study was about forty students, but this number varied widely, from fewer than ten to nearly eighty. Class sizes tended to be larger in urban areas and in government schools.

The majority of classes attended were taught in Urdu (and thus referred to the Urdu textbook, from which the English version is translated), but a number were taught in English. Other than in the elite school, even when the medium of instruction was purportedly English, the teachers explained the material in Urdu or translated it to help the students better understand it.

In grade 9 and 10 classrooms observed across government, private, and nonprofit schools, the assigned textbook reigned supreme, which is unsurprising, in that the matriculation board examination is based exclusively on the textbooks. The teachers taught almost
exclusively to the exam, making sure the students learned or memorized the content verbatim, going through the textbooks two to three times over the course of the academic year, and giving multiple tests to ensure memorization.42

The teachers taught a couple of pages of the textbook per lecture, repeating the sentences in the book, and offering little explanation and no additional learning materials. The validity of the textbook material was not questioned, and neither the teacher nor the students engaged in any evaluation of the information in the books. Classes did not veer from the topic at hand, although in some cases the teachers seemed to be teaching material from the older Punjab textbook. Some teachers referred to examples from current news or from history as further illustrations of the topic. The additional material or examples brought in were generally no more controversial or radical than the material in the textbooks. Some variations were notable: Teachers in nonprofit or private schools that emphasized improving teaching methods tended to use illustrative examples and engaged students with the material a bit creatively (assigning homework questions that deviated from the textbook exercises, for instance). The (male) teacher at the elite private school encouraged the students to further explore the material on their own and on the Internet, using Google and Wikipedia.

In government schools, male teachers seemed more likely to introduce examples from current news and history. Their female counterparts appeared less likely to diverge from the textbook, other than to ensure that their students had memorized the material. Relative to private schools, both male and female teachers in government schools stuck more closely to the curriculum and textbooks and allowed less room for teacher-student interaction in the lecture and beyond. This may be partly attributable to the larger class sizes in government schools.

Outside the classroom, student focus group discussions and teacher interviews showed variations in students’ exposure to the media, including television, newspapers, social media, and the Internet at large.43 Within and across schools, the degree of discussion varied in the home on political and security matters that included these children. Differences were also evident in family attitudes: whether they were liberal or conservative, secular or religious. Finally, access to interactions outside the home also varied and was greater for boys. Access to the Internet, unsurprisingly, was directly correlated with socioeconomic status. Gender also played a role: Boys in general appeared to have more Internet access than girls, and girls in private schools were much more likely to have access than girls in government schools. Exposure to television varied less: Most students were exposed to it. Newspaper exposure was limited across the board.

**Narratives**

**Terrorism**

To understand attitudes toward militant groups and terrorism, teachers and student focus groups were both asked a few related questions: the major problems they thought Pakistan was currently facing, how they ranked terrorism as one of those problems, the causes of terrorism, the groups involved in terrorism, and how the problem of terrorism could be fixed. These explanations helped shed light on any latent or active (logistical or financial support, or membership in an extremist organization) sympathy for terrorist groups without our directly asking a question about views of terrorist groups (which would be more sensitive and could generate nonresponse). They also helped us understand the logic behind any sympathy.
Opinions on the issue varied, with most respondents ranking terrorism as one of the most important problems Pakistan is facing; at times this response came after they were explicitly asked what they thought about terrorism. Economic problems were often at the forefront of respondents’ minds, which is not surprising in light of their family backgrounds and because they had not been direct victims.

In terms of causes of terrorism, one set of responses argued the causes were economic, that terrorism stems from poverty, unemployment, lack of education, and inequality. In the words of a female student from the nonprofit school in Lahore: “People have taken a wrong meaning of Islam. They think that Islam says this is how to do jihad. But that is not right. They come toward this because of poverty—if they had a job they wouldn’t.” Female teachers and students were more likely to offer the economic explanation.

A second, dominant response blamed “foreign influences”—India and the United States—for terrorism. Although the new textbooks barely mention terrorism and the old ones did not mention it at all, the main mention in the current Punjab grade 10 text encompasses the blame-the-U.S. explanation: “Pakistan supported America in the Afghan war but as a consequence Pakistan itself is facing terrorism.”

Explanations ranged from conspiracy theories to partially rationalized ones. The conspiracy arguments blamed the agencies or the governments of India and the United States for wanting to destroy Pakistan (some specifically pointing to an alliance between the two countries) and for training terrorists, providing them with weapons, and funding them for this purpose. “We say that bomb blasts are done by Taliban and MQM in Karachi—the major cause is the Americans and the Indians…the American agencies and the Indian agencies.” A male student from an elite private school spoke entirely in English when saying this.

The media—television, Urdu language newspapers, and social media in particular—certainly perpetuate the conspiracy theory explanations for terrorism. A few students reported something they saw online:

There was a place they showed in America, where there were religious Islamic men [maulvis], with long beards, who were being taught the Quran, but they were all kafirs [nonbelievers]—they were being sent in the midst of Muslims to derail/sidetrack Muslims.

Many argued that the United States not only wanted to cause Pakistan harm but also did not want to see Islam rising, and hence wanted to destroy all Muslim countries.

A second strand of the foreign influences explanation was more indirect, arguing that militants are engaged in terrorism to protest the U.S. war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s helping America in that war, which is seen as America’s war, and that once Pakistan stops helping the United States, terrorism will end. A related argument focused on terrorism as a mode of retaliation or revenge for drone strikes; this argument figured much more in the fall of 2013 but had receded in the May 2014 interviews, which took place during a monthslong lull in these strikes. Still, a male student from an elite private school said in early June of 2014, “When somebody kills one’s family, like America does in FATA or Waziristan, then he has to take revenge.”

That Muslims could be responsible for terrorism against other Muslims was generally not believed, just as official accounts pinning responsibility for terrorist attacks on the Taliban were considered not necessarily true and not reliable. “Whenever there is an incident, we hear after a little bit that the Taliban have claimed responsibility. But I don’t believe it,” a male student at a private school in Lahore said. Perhaps the most sophisticated version of this explanation argued that there are two types of terrorists: those working against the United States, who are pro-Pakistan, and those working against Pakistan in alliance with the United States. None are considered to be working against Pakistan on their own.
A third explanation blamed Pakistan’s government—politicians, the police, and their corruption—for terrorism. An elaboration of this view was generally lacking, however. Lack of trust in the government is a dominant narrative in contemporary Pakistani society, driven partly by the media and partly by the actual poor and insecure circumstances, under which many Pakistanis feel that they do not control their fate, economic and otherwise.

A final explanation interpreted the militants’ cause as primarily religious—to impose the Islamic way of life in Pakistan—and supported it on this basis. “They want Islam too,” a male government schoolteacher in Lahore explained. “It is the duty of Muslims to spread God’s words. They are just fulfilling their duties. Now you can call them either terrorists or jihadis.” The religious explanation appears to derive more from students’ family background and direct contact with Islamist fundamentalist groups, though the emphasis on religion and Pakistan following Islamic law in the textbooks may also contribute to it.

Two students interviewed in focus groups, a girl and a boy, from separate public schools, stood out in having more radical views than the others and were followers of Muhammad Ilyas Attar Qadri’s fundamentalist group Dawat-e-Islami. The male was a madrassa student, a Hafiz-e-Quran (one who memorizes the Quran) and a deputy imam at a mosque. In his view, terrorism was justified in terms of religion: “The day our leaders start following the examples of Khulfa-e-Rashideen [the Prophet’s four companions and successors] and when there will be Nizam-e-Mustafa [the law of Muhammad] the terrorists themselves will give up. They are Muslims too and that is their only concern.” But for him, the religious cause was conflated with anti-Americanism: “People say Taliban are not willing to talk but actually the Taliban are willing for this. But first we need to stop drone attacks. Actually we should launch an operation against the U.S. first then against any other.” The girl with the radicalized views was influenced by a pamphlet published by Dawat-e-Islami that she read in her home, though her family seemed to be followers of the group as well.

These views demonstrate a general refusal to pin the blame on militant groups, and in some cases sympathy for militant groups, as in the drone strikes or countering America explanation. The sympathy was also on occasion more direct, such as when the militant cause was seen as religious. Some respondents expressed some overlap across different explanations; others contradicted themselves by espousing two inconsistent explanations. Some students, significantly, did say that militants were traitors who espoused the wrong version of Islam and should be punished. “The Taliban are ruining the reputation and name of Islam,” a male student from a government school said.

In a number of cases, groups of students and their teachers had similar viewpoints—when the attitude was relatively uncommon, such as the economic explanation for terrorism, a transfer of views from the teacher to the students seemed to explain it. Overall, views on terrorism and terrorist groups are certainly not derived entirely from schools, though blaming the United States and India is consistent with textbook content; the religious motivation may also be reinforced by the textbooks.

The United States

The United States looms large in Pakistan. In the interviews, respondents were questioned on Pakistan’s relationships with other countries (which they perceive as Pakistan’s friends, which they don’t, and why), and specifically about U.S.-Pakistan relations and views on President Obama. These questions followed others about Pakistan’s internal situation and terrorism, but in many cases respondents brought up the United States themselves early in the discussion when talking about the causes of terrorism in Pakistan.

By and large, America is seen as dominating Pakistan, and Pakistan’s government is seen as being excessively dependent on the United States for aid, in return for which America

Overall, views on terrorism and terrorist groups are certainly not derived entirely from schools, though blaming the United States and India is consistent with textbook content; the religious motivation may also be reinforced by the textbooks.
dictates Pakistan’s internal affairs. Opinions followed a spectrum much like those on terrorism, and the picture was largely negative. Some believed that the United States and American “agencies” are training and funding terrorists in Pakistan in a bid to divide, destroy, and eventually conquer Pakistan, the United States following the colonial British policy of divide and rule. The motivation was considered to be either a war against Islam or a bid for Pakistan’s natural resources. Many respondents argued that India and the United States are allied in wanting to destroy Pakistan.

Others pointed to U.S. drone strikes and other infringements on Pakistani territory or Pakistan’s help in “America’s war” as being the root cause of Pakistan’s problems and struggle with terrorism. They argued that drone strikes, such as the one that killed Baitullah Mehsud, derail peace talks with the Taliban: If drone strikes stopped, terrorism would end.

Still others focused on Pakistan’s sovereignty and invoked the bin Laden operation and the Raymond Davis incident as violations of Pakistan’s sovereignty and lamented the Pakistani government’s inability to stand up for the country. Davis was a CIA contractor in Lahore who killed two men on a motorcycle in January 2011, was acquitted within a few weeks of all charges after payment of blood money to the victims’ families, and was flown out of Pakistan. In this context, the fate of the Pakistani Aafia Siddiqui was often mentioned in contrast to that of Raymond Davis. Siddiqui was a Pakistani neuroscientist who, while in custody in Afghanistan for suspected links to al-Qaeda, attempted to kill American security officers in 2008; she was convicted by a New York court in 2010 and is serving an eighty-six-year sentence in the United States.

Pakistan’s relationship with the United States, interviews clearly indicated, has its positives and negatives, especially over the course of history. A male student from an elite private school put this in stark terms: “Sometimes they give us aid, sometimes they kill people.” Respondents said that relations were better when Pakistan helped the United States against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan but are worse now. America was perceived as being insincere with Pakistan and as having betrayed it, especially vis-à-vis the Pakistan-India relationship. The United States is considered to have provided weapons and help to India in the 1971 war that eventually led to the separation of East Pakistan and the formation of Bangladesh (in fact, Washington provided weapons to Pakistan). Similarly, Washington is considered to have pressured France, which had wanted to help Pakistan start developing its nuclear program, to not provide help. These examples come directly from the textbooks and the classrooms.

Other respondents did not focus on U.S. policy but said that Pakistan cannot and should not have good relations with America for the simple reason that it is not a Muslim country. Ironically, these respondents said this while maintaining that China is Pakistan’s staunch friend. The same respondents at times also mentioned that America “is Jewish” or at the very least sympathetic with the Jewish people. In the words of the radical male student, “We need to follow the examples of Khulfa-e-Rashideen and fight against the enemies of Islam, dushman-e-Islam.”

The mentions of the United States in the Pakistan studies textbooks, though sparing, set the stage for respondents’ attitudes, which are filled in by media and society narratives. The textbooks offer a skeleton picture of a United States that dragged Pakistan into the Afghanistan war, leading to terrorism in Pakistan, and that has supported India over Pakistan in the dispute between the two countries by trying to thwart Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions and by helping India in the 1971 war that led to the separation of Bangladesh. Many students mentioned these points when they discussed their views.

However, respondents also discussed and invoked many recent events that are not mentioned in the textbooks. These events are discussed widely in the news and media and
are the basis of the prevailing narrative about the United States in Pakistani society. The perception of Osama bin Laden’s killing as a blow to Pakistan’s national sovereignty, for example, is a direct product of the Pakistan military’s press strategy in the wake of that event.\(^4\) The conspiracy theories about the United States running everything in Pakistan, and being responsible for everything bad that happens in the country, are constants in the Urdu language media and on social media.\(^4\)

**India and Hindus**

Little reference was made to Pakistan’s small Hindu minority—which is largely concentrated in Sindh and Karachi rather than in Punjab—but students voiced negative views of India. The two-nation theory—that Muslims and Hindus in pre-Partition India had separate customs and traditions and therefore could not live together, necessitating the creation of Pakistan—is taken as fact and widely accepted.

The goal of the state in defining itself by the conflict with India has led a large part of the textbooks to be concentrated on the India-Pakistan relationship. Student views are almost homogeneous on this topic and follow the textbook view of India as the enemy, as creating problems for Pakistan (such as in sharing river water), and generally as not being sincere in wanting to resolve the Kashmir dispute and further the cause of peace. Where the responses go beyond the textbooks is in the view of India and the Indian intelligence agency RAW (Research and Analysis Wing) as being sponsors of terrorism in Pakistan because of their desire to destroy Pakistan. This perspective is in line with the textbook framework of India as out to harm Pakistan.

**Minorities**

On the question of religious minorities (Shiites, Ahmedis, and Christians) in Pakistan, both students and teachers believe that they are treated perfectly well and that the real issue is poor treatment of Muslims in India and the United States. Attacks on religious minorities within Pakistan were not mentioned, however, only those elsewhere, which are both real and important.\(^4\) The near-universal refocus in attention to minorities in other countries, however, indicates a similar focus in the societal narrative. Minorities were by and large interpreted to be Christians (Shiites were not considered a minority). Responses also deflected attention to the more important issue, in their opinion, which is fighting between Muslim sects, and suggested that more attention is given to attacks against Christians than deserved.

Students reiterated the theoretical textbook view that minorities have equal rights in Pakistan. Although a few did acknowledge the recent attacks on Christian churches and neighborhoods, many seemed entirely removed from the reality that these minorities are persecuted; the few who mentioned attacks were the more aware students, who followed the news closely.

**Discussion and Recommendations**

Pakistan’s current educational system does not equip students to counter the prevailing, problematic narratives in society and the media. It instead both creates and propagates narratives of its own. Without any ability to question and critique sources on their own, students use the framework the school system provides them to understand the world and to fill it in with the narratives surrounding them.

Respondents with more extreme attitudes on one dimension (such as terrorism) tend to have more extreme attitudes on other dimensions as well: views of America and India, views

\[Without any ability to question and critique sources on their own, students use the framework the school system provides them to understand the world and to fill it in with the narratives surrounding them.\]
of minorities, and a cross-cutting belief in conspiracy theories. Students who believe that the Taliban are not responsible for terrorism, for example, and that the United States and India are responsible for such attacks are also more likely to have negative views of the West and India, and to believe that Muslim countries cannot be friends with non-Muslim countries.

Attitudes varied within schools. Some students appeared to be more sympathetic toward the Taliban than others, and some more radically anti-American than others. The most radical attitudes within a group seemed to arise from interactions outside the school, typically exposure to the radical materials of extremist groups in the home or in madrassas.

Peer influences are a reality: In focus group discussions, the students with more extreme views appeared to have a clear influence on the more tolerant students. The two radical students observed were loud and confident, and when they spoke their fellow students would listen to them. They spoke up more, had a clear narrative, and often invoked religion. In the Pakistani context, it is very difficult to speak up against an argument based on religion—the country’s current legal, institutional, social, and educational environment ensures that no one wants to be in that position.

Looking across schools, students from urban, male, and private schools were all more likely to offer more detailed descriptions of their views, but these views were no less extreme on average than those of students in rural, female, and government schools. This is likely because of greater exposure to and greater thought given to the media and societal narratives by these groups. On the other hand, in more remote areas without much media access, students seemed to have more of a tendency to regurgitate things heard somewhere in passing; among female students the trend was similar in government schools, where students have less access to the media and may also be less confident than their private school counterparts.

Differences in average attitudes or the spectrum of attitudes across the schools were not large, despite varied teacher training, teaching methods, teacher-student interactions, and student socioeconomic backgrounds. No student questions or contradicts what is learned in schools. For many views, we saw a direct correspondence between textbook content and what the students say, which then appears to be beefed up by societal and media narratives.

Textbooks and schools, by all these indicators, play a large role in forming and cementing views of India and Hindus. The textbooks outline the skeleton of perspectives on the United States, which the media and societal narratives then flesh out. On views on terrorism, a combination of societal narratives and the media, along with the influence of extremist organizations, helps form views and may predict radicalization. Indeed, for the origin of specific conspiracy theories that contribute to the current societal narrative about the Taliban and the United States, we need look no further than elements of the Pakistani state, politicians, and religious leaders. These groups often function as “conspiracy entrepreneurs,” creating and using these theories to divert attention from their internal failings and pin blame elsewhere. Pointing the finger at India also helps Pakistan’s military, whose power depends on sustaining the conflict with India. Of course, other conspiracy theories may arise spontaneously simply because they explain things that are otherwise difficult to understand, and the tendency to point fingers elsewhere rather than take the blame is a natural one.

Pakistanis are particularly susceptible to accepting conspiracy theories because they are never taught how to seek and evaluate information and evidence in school, making them dependent on the opinions of those in positions of authority—their teachers and textbooks at school, and the media, the state, and religious figures, all of whom propagate conspiracy theories—to form their views. Pakistani society and culture are also hierarchical, contributing to excessive emphasis on the views of authority figures. These theories then spread in “informational cascades,” in which individuals rely on the judgment of those they trust to
form their opinions; for each successive individual, it becomes more difficult to oppose the
theory because known and trusted people accept it. Conspiracy theories are hard to coun-
ter once they exist because attempts to rebut the theory can be explained as yet another
ploy by the conspirators and can further legitimize it.

The aim of the education system should be to create tolerant and analytical “global” citi-
zens. People, ordinary citizens, should be able to acquire and critically evaluate multiple
sources of information on any issue and to reject false information and conspiracy theories.
If it is to deliver on these goals, Pakistan needs another go at a systemic curriculum reform.

In light of the experience with the 2006 curriculum reform, doing so will not be easy.
That curriculum development responsibilities have now been devolved to the provinces only
makes the process more difficult. One way to go about it would be to follow the example
of the federal textbooks in India. India overhauled its federal textbooks in the mid-2000s
and chose a university professor, Krishna Kumar, to lead the effort. Their new textbooks for
high schools “demonstrate how historians work, how they use sources and evidence, and
why interpretations of the same event differ” and notably use this approach in discussing
Partition. However, the state textbooks in India continue to be biased, which shows the
difficulty with decentralized reform.

It might be easiest to start at the federal government level in advocating for reform,
and, once reform is agreed upon, to also have the federal government set a baseline level
of guidelines for the new curriculum. The provinces could then be tasked with implement-
ing the reform. The aim should be to follow an international-level curriculum that includes
rigorous analysis and critical thinking.

For Pakistan studies specifically, well-respected scholars who have authored internation-
al scholarship on the topics should be consulted in devising the curriculum and in writing
the texts. Removing negativity from textbooks is not enough. A full view of history needs
to be provided to students, not simply a mention of selected facets of history that happen
to fit into a certain narrative. Lessons on peace and tolerance and global citizenship need
to be part of the Pakistan studies curriculum. Relatedly, students should actively discuss
and debate current issues outside school. They should also be taught world history as a core
requirement in high school.

High school students should ideally be presented with scholarship on any given topic in
class and be allowed to debate its merits and be encouraged to seek out further unbiased
and reputable research to understand more about an issue. Deemphasizing the matriculation
exam and fostering classroom engagement is one way to encourage such exploration.

Any reform would of course also need to be accompanied by rigorous teacher training to
ensure that the new materials get to the students. Teachers would essentially need to be
reeducated twice—once to understand the materials themselves and again to teach in an
entirely different way.

Such reform will take time to take effect, and results will be apparent only in the longer
term. But reform should be pursued with urgency. Some changes that are easier to imple-
ment can begin immediately, and additional changes made incrementally.

Pakistan’s government should halt the circulation of terrorist narratives, from both
mainstream media and the madrassas. It took a few major steps in this direction after the
Peshawar attack by articulating the need for madrassa reform and asking media not to give
terrorist statements any airtime. But militants (and conspiracy theorists) like Hafiz Saeed,
who blamed the Peshawar attack on India, are still allowed to conduct large public rallies,
and government security is provided for them. This certainly needs to end.
Notes

1. The study reported here did not focus on Pakistan’s parallel British-examination-based elite private schooling system or on religious madrasas in the fieldwork. It was designed as an in-depth examination of the official education system catering to the vast majority of the population. For a discussion of attitudes in public versus elite private schools that follow the British curriculum and in madrasas, see Tarig Rahman, Denizens of Alien Worlds: A Study of Education, Inequality and Polarization in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2004). Rahman documents both more tolerant and less “militant” attitudes of students in the elite private schools relative to government schools, and less tolerant and more militant attitudes of students in madrasas relative to government schools.


3. This poll was also undertaken before the Karachi airport attack in June 2014. Forty-two percent of respondents reported unfavorable views of al-Qaeda and 59 percent of respondents reported unfavorable views of the Taliban; more than 30 percent abstained from responding about each of these organizations.


12. Despite contentious content in the Urdu, Islamic studies (Islamiyat), and English textbooks, a quick review of these and attending classes in these subjects during the pilot indicated greater problematic content in the Pakistani studies books.


14. We were mainly interested in the views of students but conducted teacher interviews to identify parallels in thinking, which can be indicative of the influence of the teacher.


16. In Lahore, the twelve schools visited in the first phase of fieldwork were divided as follows: five government girls’ schools, four government boys’ schools, two private girls’ schools, and one private boys’ school. In Sheikhupura, one government girls’ school, one government boys’ school, one private girls’ school, and one private boys’ school were chosen.

17. In boys’ government schools, the teachers are male; in the girls’ government schools, the teachers are female. The teachers’ gender in private schools could be different from the students’ gender, but there are more female teachers in boys’ private schools than male teachers in girls’ private schools.


21. Ibid.

22. In an interview with the chairman and senior staff at the Punjab Textbook Board in October 2013, it appeared that the board was very unhappy with the paring down of its role given that it had subject specialists and expertise. It considered the quality of the books written by private publishers to be deficient because of their lack of expertise and the incentives for corruption by the government in granting the contract, and profit maximization by the publisher in keeping costs, and therefore quality, low. On the other hand, officials at the Curriculum Authority argued that the Punjab Textbook Board ran a monopoly and compromised quality.

23. Interview with the chairman and senior staff of the Punjab Curriculum Authority, Lahore, October 2013.
28. Ibid., p. 126.
29. Pakistan Studies, Class IX-X, pp. 43, 55.
31. Pakistan Studies, Class 9, p. 126.
32. Ibid., p. 127.
34. Pakistan Studies, Class IX-X, p. 244.
37. Pakistan Studies, Class IX-X, p. 244.
38. Ibid., p. 262.
40. Ibid., p. 49.
41. Some interviewed teachers expressed confusion about the required medium for instruction for Pakistan studies. Apparently the government had recently mandated that it be English but had changed the requirement back to letting the school choose.
42. In fact, classes could not be observed in all schools because the students were having exams at various different points throughout the year, but both grade 9 and grade 10 classes were attended in a large majority of schools visited.
43. The effect of the media on attitudes has been documented in the literature. As an example, see Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse Shapiro, “Media, Education and Anti-Americanism in the Muslim World,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 3 (2004): 117–33.
44. The assassin of Punjab’s governor Salman Taseer was a member of this organization and adopted Qadri’s name as his own.
50. Ibid.
Of Related Interest

- **Conflict Dynamics in Sindh** by Huma Yusuf and Syed Shoaiab Hasan (Peaceworks, January 2015)
- **Religious Authority and the Promotion of Sectarian Tolerance in Pakistan** by Michael Kalin and Niloufer Siddiqui (Special Report, October 2014)
- **Youth Radicalization in Pakistan** by Raheem ul Haque (Peace Brief, February 2014)
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- **Pakistan and the Narratives of Extremism** by Amil Khan (Special Report, March 2013)
- **Conflict Dynamics in Karachi** by Huma Yusuf (Peaceworks, October 2012)