Conceptual Approaches to Threat Reduction Expansion: Context and Principles

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## Agenda

- Approaches to defining Nunn-Lugar
- Some important themes to consider
- Expanding the Nunn-Lugar model


For the purposes of this presentation, "Nunn-Lugar" and "CTR" refer to all of the various programs managed by the U.S. Departments of Defense (DoD), Energy (DOE), State (DOS), etceteras, and their counterpart agencies in the former Soviet Union. Although CTR is the official name only of the DoD program, there is no other convenient moniker with which to refer to all U.S. Government efforts in this area.

# **Defining Nunn-Lugar**

## What is Nunn-Lugar?

- Descriptive: mechanical approach
- Theoretical: conceptual approach
- Taxonomy: comparative approach

#### **Descriptive: The Nunn-Lugar Process**




## **Conceptual 1: Broad Look**

- An arrangement through which states work together to address <u>common security objectives</u>, generally implemented <u>below the</u> <u>formal treaty level</u>, and involving the <u>donation of equipment</u> <u>and services</u> from one state to another
- Effort to extend financial and technical support to dismantle delivery systems and to secure and control warheads and fissile materials
- Evolution: process of constructive engagement on a topic both sides would allow to occur
  - Common purpose stable managerial control
  - Direct collaboration for mutual benefit, as opposed to deterrent relationship
- Process of transformation of security relationship from confrontation to collaboration

## **Conceptual 2: Traditional Arms Control**

- 1961: arms control and military strategy are not antithetical; indeed, arms control should be considered a supplementary means of achieving strategic objectives
- Basic principles:
  - reducing the risk of war
  - reducing the cost of preparing for war
  - reducing the damage should war occur
- 1993: *cooperative engagement* became the appropriate principle for dealing with the new security threats
- 9/11: arms control no longer an independent endeavor with tenuous links to broader national and international security policies

## **Taxonomy 1: Preventive Defense Continuum**



#### • CTR: links with above, but something new


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## **Taxonomy 2: Where does CTR fit?**




## **Taxonomy 3: Models for CTR**

- Arms Control: Treaties
  - Written agreements
  - Verification
  - Goals/objectives
  - Limitations; reductions
- Foreign Aid: Marshall Plan
  - Contain Communism
  - Post war
  - Intended to head off perceived threat vice existing forces
  - Buy American
  - Export American contracting and business practices

- Cooperative Security: CBMs
  - Intangibles
  - Interactions of military officers and civilian officials
  - Mil-to-mil programs
  - Int'l project management
- Collective Security: NATO
  - NATO model of continual reassurances among historical adversaries
  - Akin to the Nunn-Lugar interaction of military officers, bureaucrats, business executives, and scientists

## **Evolution in Thinking About Nunn-Lugar**



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## **Important Themes**

### **Dismantlement versus Nonproliferation**

- Original name: Safe, Secure Dismantlement
- Tension between two concepts/objectives of dismantlement & nonproliferation
  - US objectives/concerns versus Russian objectives/concerns
- Original legislative emphasis on *dismantlement*, then quickly evolved toward *nonproliferation*
  - Nonetheless, stable managerial control over nuclear operations was prominent driver at original program conception

## **Donor-Client Psychology**

- Important to US authorizers and implementers
  - "Our money" & "we're the victors" attitude
  - Rejected principle of reciprocity
- Significant impact on Russian perceptions
  - Psychology of dependence real; resentment of it
- Statutory linkages: congressional certification requirements
- Result: <u>'coercive threat reduction'</u> [BGen Kuenning]
- Where the process has worked well, the parties have subordinated this theme
  - Successful projects: mutual relationship

# Nunn-Lugar Expansion

## **Modes of Expansion**

- Vertical: more of the same
  - Expanding existing FSU projects
- Horizontal: expansion of the cooperative aspects of the program to a conceptual basis for bilateral relations
  - Transforming the security relationship
  - Replacing, or at least subordinating, MAD
- Geographical: applied to other regions

## **Generalizing the Model: Nunn-Lugar's Drivers**

- Arms Control Treaty/Agreement Obligations
- Safety & Security
- Economic Disintegration
- Military Security
- Political Instability
- Other

## Nunn-Lugar's Principles & Concepts

- Cooperation
- Expectations
- Flexibility/Adaptability
- Relationships
- Economic and Industrial Development

## **Venues for a General Model**

- Bilateral Programs
- Multilateral
- Non-Governmental Organizations
- Professional & Commercial Associations
- Scientific Laboratories
- International Organizations
- International Groups

## **Thought Experiment: Inventing Nunn-Lugar**

- What if we could start from scratch?
- How would we design the program?
- What are the alternative US policy options? Should the program be implemented on its own, or in a supporting role?
- Why would a state choose to accept foreign threat reduction assistance? What are that state's alternative policy options? Who would make that choice?
- How would we want to measure the effectiveness/success of the program?
- How would we design the life-cycle of the program? What is the end point, or final objective? What is the critical path; how do we get there?

## Conclusions

- Are we currently in a position to initiate major new policy?
  - No: dramatic changes in policy made only during formative moments
  - Therefore, the expansion of Threat Reduction must be evolutionary
- Too much focus on the transferability of specific projects as designed to be implemented in the FSU
- Better: focus on the transferability of the Nunn-Lugar principles as conceived in early post-Cold War era
- Policy of incremental possibilities
  - Keep doors open
  - Adjust policies as needed
  - Build trust
  - Hope more doors open