

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

PUAF 720
Spring 2019
Tuesdays 1:30 pm – 4 pm
VMH 1107

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Course Description

The course reviews the principal features of international security as currently practiced. It traces the evolution of contemporary policy and other determining circumstances through the sequence of formative experience whereby current international security conditions developed. Understanding the consequence of formative experience is indispensable for adequate comprehension of the prevailing concepts, organizing principles, military deployment patterns, legal regulations, and political relationships that determine the current state of international security.

The course begins with the circumstances and choices that shaped security policy after World War II. Contemporary security policy has deeper historical roots, but developments during the Cold War shaped the concepts, institutions, force structures, arms control agreements, and political debates that are particularly important today. Although it is common to assert that we are in a new era, anyone who does not understand the formative events and enduring legacy of that period will not understand the contemporary problems covered in the second half of the semester. Reviewing history from contemporary perspective is a revisionist perspective from the point of view of those who lived through the events in question, but it is legitimate and important to use the advantage of retrospect to understand current circumstances.

The course is intended to be useful and appropriate for all people of whatever national affiliation. There is heavy emphasis on the experience of the United States and of Russia as principal successor to the Soviet Union because the historical interaction between these two countries has disproportionately affected the international security conditions that all other countries now experience. Understanding this experience is a necessary foundation for any more focused national security perspective a student might wish to develop.

Requirements

This course is designed to help students develop the broad knowledge and analytical skills needed to understand complex policy issues, as well as the oral, written, and interpersonal skills needed to participate effectively in policy debates. Students will maintain the highest standards of professional behavior and will adhere to the University of Maryland's Code of Academic Integrity, Code of Conduct, and other education policies (<http://www.ugst.umd.edu/courserelatedpolicies.html>).

To prepare students to be effective participants in security policy debates, class participation counts for 20% of the grade and will be evaluated in several different ways. Students are expected to prepare thoroughly, attend consistently, and engage actively in class discussions. Please e-mail me in advance if you must miss class for any reason.

Students should attend at least three special events related to international security policy (e.g., CISSM forums, other such events on campus or downtown, Congressional hearings, movies, webinars, etc.). For each event, they should post a reaction paragraph or two on the class discussion board connecting it to what we are reading and discussing in class. Please also e-mail me your reaction paragraphs I can track them. They will be graded as a check or a plus for participation.

Students are also encouraged to use the on-line forum to continue discussions begun in class; to share relevant news, articles, and event announcements; and to pose questions about readings that they want to discuss during the next class. Use of this forum will also factor into participation grade.

Students will sign up to write several short (1200 words) analytical memos in response to questions posed and readings assigned in the syllabus. (Arguments and evidence from outside readings can be incorporated but are not required). At least one memo should be submitted before spring break and one after it. Memos should be e-mailed to me by 11 am on the day of the session to which they pertain. No memos will be accepted after the relevant class session.

Each memo will be graded on five main criteria.

- 1) Does it have a clear, coherent, compelling, and creative central argument?
- 2) Is that central argument well supported?
- 3) Are counter-arguments and/or alternative points of view weighed?
- 4) Are important and interesting policy implications drawn from the analysis?
- 5) Is the memo professionally written — grammatically correct, appropriate tone, fact checked, numbered pages, etc.?

For guidance on writing clear, effective policy memos, see the sample 720 memo and George Orwell's essay on "Politics and the English Language," both of which are in the class resource folder. Students may rewrite one analytical memo and have the average score recorded. The rewrite must be submitted NLT two weeks after the initial grade and comments were received. No rewrites will be accepted after the last class session.

We will do an optional joint policy exercise and other activities with some students from the Moscow-based Institute for U.S.A. and Canada Studies (ISKRAN) the week of April 8-15. This year's topic will be what the US and Russia should do before the 2020 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Review conference to convince non-nuclear weapons states that they are living up to their commitment to reduce, and ultimately eliminate their nuclear weapons.

Active participation is essential to the success of the joint exercise, so students who want to be full participants should make arrangements to be available for all of the joint sessions and to devote time to the drafting of the initial memo and the post-exercise memo. 720 students unable to do that will write a third individual memo in lieu of the joint policy exercise group memo. They are still encouraged to attend the social events we arrange for the ISKRAN group, including the movie night and the CISSM-ISKRAN dinner at my house.

After Spring break, students participating in the joint policy exercise will write a team "food for thought" memo laying out how they define the policy problem of the joint exercise and some cooperative options they would like to explore with their Russian counterparts. The "food for thought" memos should be exchanged with ISKRAN counterparts by April 3.

The ISKRAN group will attend class on April 9th. We will start with an informal lunch and conversation from 12:30-1:30 pm, all-class discussion of the policy issues from 1:30-3:00 pm and initial team meetings from 3:00-4 pm. The most important interactions of the joint policy exercise will occur on Thursday, April 11th from 1:30 pm through 5:30 pm. If you have a class that Thursday afternoon, please make sure that your professor will excuse you before committing to do the joint policy exercise.

After the visit, the MSPP team will write a memo for me summarizing the policy objectives they had for the ISKRAN meetings, the points of agreement and disagreement that emerged from those meetings, and the recommendations that they would give U.S. policymakers for how to move forward with Russia on the topic. I will give each memo a base grade, and then award individual students bonus points based on their own evaluation of the exercise and their team-mates' evaluations of their contributions. This memo is due two weeks after the joint policy exercise, on April 26th.

The final synthetic policy memo (2000 words) will integrate concepts and evidence from multiple class sessions (assigned readings and discussions) and additional research if desired. It can build on ideas developed through one of the short analytical memos or the joint policy exercise. If students focus on a security policy problem that has not been a featured topic for this course, they need to show how what they have read, heard, and learned in this class helps them think through that policy problem. The memo should explain to a national leader (US president or other country) or to the UN Secretary General why the issue you have chosen should be a top priority for international security, what the key elements of an effective response would be, and how the world could move from where we are toward the desired outcome. It should assess the strengths and weaknesses of current policy and recommend the five most important things that should be done to better address that problem. It will be due one week after the last class session.

Grading breakdown:

Participation	(in-class, on-line forum, special events)	20%
Analytical Memos	1 st memo	15%
	2 nd memo	20%
	3 rd memo or joint policy exercise memo	15%
Final memo	due <u>4 pm</u> May 21	30%

Readings and Resources

The central reading for the historical part of the course is McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival*. Although the book is out of print, Francesca Perry (room 4130, fperry1@umd.edu, ext. 57611) has used copies that she will sell for \$5 and repurchase at the end of the semester.

The campus bookstore has copies of two recommended books. Several chapters of John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: a New History* are assigned and the whole book is relevant. Since the course deals extensively with nuclear issues, the bookstore also has Richard Garwin and Georges Charpak,

Megawatts and Megatons, which is useful for students who have a particular interest in nuclear weapons and energy technologies.

The course also relies heavily on articles and reports, many of which are available on the internet, and links have been provided whenever possible. The remainder of the assigned readings will be placed on reserve using the Canvas system. To access these readings, go to <https://elms.umd.edu> and enter your user name and password (the same ones that you use to access your University of Maryland email account), and then click on PUA 720. Depending on class interests and developments in current policy debates, I may supplement or substitute readings as the semester progresses.

Schedule

(1) **Introduction (January 29)**

Reading: McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, pp. 3-11, pp. 45-63, and pp. 113-129.

Question for reflection: Was the use of nuclear weapons inevitable once the basic physical principles were understood? What does this imply for current efforts to control nuclear weapons and other advanced technologies with military applications?

(2) **Determinants of International Order (February 5)**

Readings:

Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia U. P., 1977), pp. 3-52.

John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: A New History* (Penguin Press, 2005), pp. 5-47

Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshankov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War* (Harvard University Press, 1996), pp. 1-8 and 36-77

United Nations Charter, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/docs/UNCharter.pdf>

Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, "The Failure of International Control," pp. 130-196 in *D&S*.

George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (1947), at:

<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/23331/x/the-sources-of-soviet-conduct>

NSC 68 (United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950)

https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf.

Memo Question: How did the US and USSR move in five short years from being victorious allies in World War II to heading opposing alliances in the Cold War? What lessons would you draw about ability of major powers with a mix of common and competing interests to cooperate on shared security problems?

(3) **Nuclear Weapons, Coercive Diplomacy, and Deterrence (February 12)**

Readings:

Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, pp. 197-235 and 319-357.

Charles L. Glaser, "Why do Strategists Disagree about the Requirements of Strategic Nuclear Deterrence?" pp. 109-171 in Lynn Eden and Steven Miller, eds., *Nuclear Arguments* (Cornell U.P., 1989).

Carol Cohn, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," *Signs* 12:4 (Summer 1987), pp. 687-718

Memo question: Were the size and operational configuration of the nuclear forces originally deployed by the United States and the Soviet Union strategically justified?

(4) **Limited War vs. Civil Conflict: Vietnam and Afghanistan in the Cold War (February 19)**

Readings:

James Patterson, *Grand Expectations* (Oxford UP, 1996), pp. 593-636 and 743-770

Alex Wallerstein, "Would Nukes have Helped in Vietnam?" Nuclear Secrecy Blog post July 25, 2014, at: <http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2014/07/25/nukes-helped-vietnam/>

Mark Galeotti, *Afghanistan: The Soviet Union's Last War* (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 1-25, 139-171

Robert McNamara, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, Inc., 1995), pp 319-335

Melvin Laird, "Iraq: Learning the Lessons of Vietnam," *Foreign Affairs* (November/December 2005)

Stephen Biddle, "Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon," *Foreign Affairs* (March/April 2006)

Memo Question: Why weren't the United States and the Soviet Union able to prevail over much weaker adversaries in Vietnam and Afghanistan? What, if any lessons, would you draw about the relative importance of military power and political legitimacy when foreign powers intervene in civil conflicts because they see them as part of a larger security problem?

(5) **Arms Control (February 26)**

Readings

Nancy W. Gallagher, *Arms Control in the Nuclear Age*, Chapter Summaries (9 pp. mns)

Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, pp. 543-583

James Schear, "Verification, Compliance, and Arms Control: The Dynamics of Domestic Debate," pp. 264-321 in Eden and Miller, ed., *Nuclear Arguments*

Thomas Schelling, "What Went Wrong with Arms Control?" *Foreign Affairs* 64:2 (Winter, 1985)

Albert Carnesale and Richard Haass, eds., *Superpower Arms Control: Setting the Record Straight* (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 329-357

Gray, Colin S., "Arms control does not control arms," *Orbis* 37:3 (Summer 1993), 16p

Memo question: Did arms control make a meaningful contribution to security during the Cold War, or was it either a waste of time or a dangerous delusion?

(6) **The Incomplete Ending of the Cold War (Mar 5)**

Readings:

Bundy, *Danger and Survival*, pp. 584-617

John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War*, pp. 195-237

Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989), pp. 3-18.

Jeffrey W. Knopf, "Did Reagan Win the Cold War?" *Strategic Insights*, 3:8, August 2004;
<https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=444565>

Pavel Podvig, "Did Star Wars Help End the Cold War?" *Science and Global Security* 25:1
(Winter 2017), pp. 3-27.

Catherine Kelleher, "Cooperative Security in Europe," pp. 293-353 in Janne Nolan, ed., *Global Engagement*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994)

Goldgeier, James, "Promises Made, Promises Broken," *War on the Rocks* (July 12, 2016):

<https://warontherocks.com/2016/07/promises-made-promises-broken-what-yeltsin-was-told-about-nato-in-1993-and-why-it-matters/>

Dimitri Simes, "Losing Russia: The Costs of Renewed Confrontation," *Foreign Affairs*
(November/December 2007)

Memo question: What explains the peaceful ending of the Cold War? In retrospect, how well were the fundamental security problems resolved?

(7) **Civil Violence/Human Security (Mar 12)**

Readings:

John Steinbruner and Jason Forrester, "Perspectives on Civil Violence: A Review of Current Thinking," pp. 1-27 in William Lahneman, ed., *Military Intervention* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004)

J. Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr, *Peace and Conflict 2008*, Executive Summary (CIDCM)

Gareth Evans, "Cooperative Security and Intra-State Conflict," *Foreign Policy*, (1996)

Edward W. Luttwak, "Give War a Chance," *Foreign Affairs*, (July/Aug 1999), pp. 36-44

Mohammed Ayoob, "Humanitarian Intervention and State Sovereignty," *International Journal of Human Rights* 6:1 (Spring 2002)

International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect* (December 2001), pp. xi – 20, at <http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf>

Karen A. Mingst and Margaret P. Karns, "The United Nations and Conflict Management," in Chester A. Crocker, et al., *Leashing the Dogs of War*, (USIP, 2007), pp. 497-520

Memo question: Is the control of civil conflict within sovereign states a general international interest?

**** Spring Break (March 19) ****

(8) Strategies for Nuclear Security in the 21st Century (March 26)

Readings:

- Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security* 21:3 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 5-53
- Sidney Drell and James Goodby, "What are Nuclear Weapons For?" An Arms Control Association Report (revised and updated October 2007), at: http://www.armscontrol.org/system/files/20071104_Drell_Goodby_07_new.pdf
- Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, "The Nukes We Need: Preserving the American Deterrent," *Foreign Affairs* 88:6 (November/December 2009), pp. 39-51.
- Barack Obama, "Remarks in Prague, Czech Republic," (April 5, 2009), at: <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-obama-prague-delivered>.
- "New START at a Glance," Arms Control Association Fact Sheet, October 2010, <http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/NewSTART>
- Nikolai Sokov, "The Return of Nuclear Weapons," November 28, 2014, at: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/nikolai-sokov/%E2%80%98return%E2%80%99-of-nuclear-weapons>.
- The Deep Cuts Commission, "Back from the Brink: Toward Restraint and Dialogue Between Russia and the West," (June 2016), at: http://deepcuts.org/images/PDF/Third_Report_of_the_Deep_Cuts_Commission_English.pdf.
- 2018 Nuclear Posture Review Executive Summary (15 pp): <https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/2018-Nuclear-Posture-Review-Version-2.pdf>
- Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy, "The Nuclear Posture Review and Russian 'De-Escalation': A Dangerous Solution to a Nonexistent Problem," *War on the Rocks*, February 20, 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/nuclear-posture-review-russian-de-escalation-dangerous-solution-nonexistent-problem/>

Memo Question: In setting policy objectives for the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons programs, what is the appropriate priority of interest among preserving deterrence, threatening pre-emption, assuring strict managerial control over reduced arsenals, and/or eliminating nuclear weapons? The annexation of Crimea has made U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation more difficult, but does it also make it more important?

(9) Proliferation (April 2)

Readings:

- Francis Gavin, "Strategies of Inhibition: U.S. Grand Strategy, the Nuclear Revolution, and Nonproliferation," *International Security* 40:1 (Summer 2015), pp. 9-46.
- Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): <https://1997-2001.state.gov/global/arms/treaties/npt1.html>
- Jim Walsh, "Learning from Past Success: the NPT and the Future of Non-Proliferation," (October 2005), WMDC paper no. 41 at: <http://www.wmdcommission.org/files/no41.pdf>

- Christopher F. Chyba, Chaim Braun, and George Bunn, “New Challenges to the Nonproliferation Regime” and “Strategies for Tackling Proliferation Challenges,” pp. 126-219 in Bunn and Chyba, eds. *U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy* (Stanford, 2006)
- Rebecca Johnson, “Assessing the 2010 NPT Review Conference,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (July/August 2010)
- Christopher A. Ford, “The 2015 NPT Review Conference and the Nonproliferation Regime,” *New Paradigms Forum* (June 3, 2015), at: <http://www.newparadigmsforum.com/NPFtestsite/?p=1922>
- Scott Sagan, “The Korean Missile Crisis: Why Deterrence is Still the Best Option,” *Foreign Affairs* 96 (November/December 2017)
- Robert Jervis, “Unpacking a US Decision to Use Force against North Korea: Issues, Options, and Consequences,” *38 North Special Report* (January 2018): https://www.38north.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/38-North-SR-1801_Jervis.pdf
- Bruce Klingner, “Maximum Pressure and Engagement – Still Pulling Punches on U.S. Policy toward North Korea, SFRC testimony, July 25, 2017: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/072517_Klingner_Testimony.pdf
- Leon Sigal, “A Strategy for Dealing with North Korea,” SFRC testimony, July 25, 2017: https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/072517_Sigal_Testimony.pdf
- Jon Wolfsthal, “A Crucial First Step for Negotiating with North Korea,” (March 16, 2018): <https://warontherocks.com/2018/03/when-negotiating-with-north-korea-the-first-step-may-be-the-hardest/>.

Memo Question: Is cooperative nonproliferation, coercive counter-proliferation, or some combination of those strategies that best way to address concerns about nuclear programs in countries like Iran and/or North Korea?

(10) ISKRAN Visit (April 9)

- Vladimir Putin, “Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” (Feb 2007) <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html>
- Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Crisis Management,” *Survival* 56:3 (June/July 2014), pp. 7-42.
- Dmitri Trenin, “Russia’s Breakout from the Post-Cold War System,” Carnegie Moscow Center, (December 2014), at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP_Trenin_Putin2014_web_Eng_1.pdf
- Fiona Hill, “Putin: The One-Man Show the West Doesn’t Understand,” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 72:3 (2016) at: <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00963402.2016.1170361>.

Schedule of joint activities (update)

<u>April 3</u>	Food for thought memos to ISKRAN (send to dentrik@umd.edu)	
<u>April 9</u>		
Lunch and get-acquainted conversation		12:30-1:20 pm
Joint discussion of the policy problems		1:30-3:00 pm
Preliminary team discussions		3:00-4:00 pm

April 10

Pizza dinner and Video: “A Walk in the Woods”

7:00-8:30 pm

April 11

CISSM Forum:

12:00-1:15 pm

Joint Policy Working Groups

1:30-4:00 pm

Joint Policy Presentation

4:15- 5:15 pm

CISSM –ISKRAN Dinner (Gallagher house)

6:30-8:00 pm

April 13-14

Sightseeing – ISO volunteers to spend one or both days with some of the ISKRAN students.

(11) Security in Asia (April 16)

Readings

Muthiah Alagappa, “Asia’s Security Environment: From Subordinate to Region Dominant System,” Chapter 1 in *The Long Shadow* (Stanford UP, 2008)

David Shaumbaugh, “China’s Global Economic Presence,” pp. 121-155 in *China Goes Global: The Partial Power* Oxford University Press, 2013)

James B. Steinberg, “Administration’s Vision of the U.S.-China Relationship,” Keynote Address at the Center for a New American Security, Washington, D.C., September 24, 2009, at:

<https://2009-2017.state.gov/s/d/former/steinberg/remarks/2009/169332.htm>.

Thomas J. Christensen, “Obama and Asia: Confronting the China Challenge,” *Foreign Affairs* (2015).

Lora Saalman, “China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, (February 2011), pp. 1–39, at:

http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/china_posture_review.pdf.

Gregory Kulacki, “China’s Nuclear Force: Modernizing from Behind,” Union of Concerned Scientists, <https://allthingsnuclear.org/gkulacki/china-and-trumps-nuclear-posture-review>

“Dangerous Waters: China-Japan Relations on the Rocks,” International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 245 (April 8, 2013), at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/china/dangerous-waters-china-japan-relations-rocks>.

Memo Question: How should the United States respond to China’s growing economic, military, and political power?

(12) Security in the Middle East (April 23)

Readings:

Peter Sluglett, “The Cold War in the Middle East,” pp. 41-58 in Louise Fawcett, ed., *International Relations of the Middle East* (Oxford, 2005)

- Bahgat Korany, "The Middle East since the Cold War: Torn between Geopolitics and Geoeconomics," in Louise Fawcett, ed., *International Relations of the Middle East* (Oxford, 2005), pp. 59-76
- Toby Dodge, "Iraqi Transitions: from Regime Change to State Collapse," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 26, No. 4-5, 2005, pp 705-721
- Daniel Byman, "Explaining the Western Response to the Arab Spring," *The Journal of Strategic Studies* 36:2 (2013)
- Kenneth M. Pollack, "Fight or Flight: America's Choice in the Middle East," *Foreign Affairs* (March 1, 2016).
- Madoka Futamura, Edward Newman, and Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, "Towards a Human Security Approach to Peacebuilding," United Nations University Research Brief (2010): [http://www.academia.edu/3487244/ Towards a Human Security Approach to Peacebuilding United Nations University Research Brief No.2 2010 with Madoka Futamura and Edward Newman](http://www.academia.edu/3487244/Towards_a_Human_Security_Approach_to_Peacebuilding_United_Nations_University_Research_Brief_No.2_2010_with_Madoka_Futamura_and_Edward_Newman).
- Anthony Cordesman, "The [New-Old] Crises and Instability in the Middle East and North Africa in 2016," Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2016, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/new-old-crises-and-instability-middle-east-and-north-africa-2016>

Memo Question: Does the United States have a viable strategy for security in the Middle East that does not require open-ended military commitments?

(13) Terrorism (April 30)

- Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," *International Security* 27:3 (Winter 2002/3), pp. 30-58
- Daniel Byman, "Do Counterproliferation and Counterterrorism Go Together?" *Political Science Quarterly* 122:1 (2007), pp. 25-46
- Scott Atran, "The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2006) https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v029/29.2atran.html
- Matthew Kroenig and Barry Pavel, "How to Deter Terrorism," *The Washington Quarterly* (Spring 2012): https://csis.org/files/publication/TWQ_12Spring_Kroenig_Pavel.pdf
- David J. Kilcullen, "Countering Global Insurgency," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, (August 2005), pp. 597-617
- Ömer Taşpinar, "Fighting Radicalism, not 'Terrorism': Root Causes of an International Actor Redefined," *SAIS Review* 29:2 (Summer-Fall, 2009)
- Richard Atwood, et al., "Exploiting Disorder: al-Qaeda and the Islamic State," International Crisis Group Special Report, (March 14, 2016) at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/exploiting-disorder-al-qaeda-and-islamic-state>

Memo Question: Should terrorism be a primary international security priority?

(14) Cybersecurity (May 7)

- David Clark, Thomas Berson, and Herbert S. Lin, eds., *At the Nexus of Cybersecurity and Public Policy: Some Basic Concepts and Issues*, (National Academies of Sciences,

2014) Chap 1-4, at: <https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF02/20150303/103079/HHRG-114-IF02-20150303-SD006.pdf>.)

Joseph Nye, "Deterrence and Dissuasion in Cyberspace," *International Security* 41:3 (Winter 2016/2017), pp. 44-71.

National Cyber Strategy of the United States (September 2018) at:

<https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/National-Cyber-Strategy.pdf>

Charles Harry and Nancy Gallagher, "An Effects-Centric Approach to Assessing Cybersecurity Risk," *CISSM Policy Paper* (2019) at:

Memo Question: What are the guiding principles for US cybersecurity strategy? How well do these principles translate into policies that are likely to be appropriate and effective for this type of security problem?

(15) The Future of Global Security (May 14)

Readings

National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends: Paradoxes of Power* (January 2017), pp. 1-69
http://www.globalsecurity.org/intell/library/reports/2017/global-trends_paradox-of-progress_full_20170109.pdf

Managing Global Insecurity Project, "A Plan for Action," September 2008, at:

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/11_action_plan_mgi.pdf

John Bolton, "Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?" *Chicago Journal of International Law* 205 (Fall 2000), pp. 205-221

Thomas G. Weiss, "Toward a Third Generation of International Institutions: Obama's UN Policy," *The Washington Quarterly* (July 2009), pp. 141-162 at:

<http://csis.org/files/publication/twq09julyweiss.pdf>

John Steinbruner, "Security Policy and the Question of Fundamental Change," CISSM Working Paper (November 2010), at:

<http://cisssm.umd.edu/publications/security-policy-and-question-fundamental-change-0>