This report is part of a series of surveys related to Iran that CISSM has conducted since 2013. It is based on data about attitudes on Iran's nuclear program, the wars in Gaza and Ukraine, relations with regional players and global powers, and a range of other foreign policy issues collected in three surveys conducted between March 2023 and October 2024. It also includes findings regarding the 2024 presidential election and expectations for President Pezeshkian at the start of his term.
View the March 2023 questionnaire and trend table.
View the March 2024 questionnaire and trend table.
View the October 2024 questionnaire and trend table.
Findings about Iranian attitudes on domestic issues drawn from the surveys conducted in March 2023 and March 2024, shortly before President Raisi was killed in a helicopter crash in May 2024, were previously published in another report.
Summary of Findings
1. The Summer 2024 Presidential Election (p. 9)
Asked who deserves credit for the country’s stability during the lead-up to this election–which had to be organized and conducted quickly after President Raisi’s passing–large majorities think the most credit goes to the people themselves and to Ayatollah Khamenei, followed by Iran’s constitution. A bare majority say they voted in the second round of the elections, and four in ten that they voted in the first round. One out of ten of all respondents voted in the second round but not the first. Large majorities of Pezeshkian and Jalili voters both say they thought their candidate would be a good president; less than one in five say they voted mostly to block the opposing candidate. Those who did not vote in the second round (over four in ten) most frequently mention a loss of hope or trust as the reason. A modest majority think Iran’s election law should be changed, but fewer think so than before. Almost half view the general desire for improvement in Iran’s situation as the main message of the presidential election.
2. Economic Dissatisfaction (p. 13)
While seven in ten view Iran’s economic situation as bad, those who call it very bad are no longer a majority. Three in five see the economy as getting worse, but this is fewer than before.
3. Evaluation of Restrictive Social Policies and System Stability (p. 14)
Opposition to some strict domestic policies is growing. Almost four in five oppose the government continuing limits and filters on social networks, and nearly two-thirds oppose this strongly. Over three in five believe that women who do not observe hijab correctly should not be confronted; those who think they should be confronted have dropped to one-third. Only a third believe that in general, people in Iran feel comfortable voicing their political opinions, but only a quarter say people are generally afraid. The rest say people are somewhere in between. A slim majority feel that most government officials do not care what people like them think. When asked about officials appointed by the new president Pezeshkian, however, slightly under half feel this way. Despite these grievances, around three in four expect Iran’s constitution and political system to be about the same in ten years, slightly more than in 2023. About one in seven have disagreed since 2023.
4. Expectations for President Pezeshkian (p. 18)
About two-thirds view the new president favorably; a clear majority are also favorable toward Araghchi, the foreign minister. At the beginning of his term, seven in ten expressed confidence that Pezeshkian will be an honest and trustworthy president, though only a quarter were very confident of this. Three in five name economic issues as the single most important challenge for the country. Majorities express some confidence that Pezeshkian can improve relations with neighboring countries and protect the freedoms of citizens, notably women’s rights. Majorities are not confident that he can lower inflation or improve relations with the West.
5. Relations with the United States (p. 22)
In October 2024, about half were following news about the upcoming U.S. election. There was no majority guess at the time as to whether Donald Trump or Kamala Harris would win, though earlier (in March, while President Biden was still the Democratic candidate) a clear majority had expected Trump’s victory. Asked before the U.S. election to rate Trump’s probable policies toward Iran on a 0-to-10 scale, the median response was 0. Expectations if the Democratic candidate won were somewhat less negative; the median response in October for Harris was 4, while in March for Biden it was 3. Seven in ten Iranians view the United States very unfavorably, a very slight drop from 2023. Only one in ten regard the United States as a model country; a quarter see it as no better or worse than any other country; and over three in five view it as dangerous, seeking confrontation and control. In some contexts, though, attitudes have been more nuanced. In 2023 only one in five blamed the United States specifically for the war in Ukraine, and only three in ten believed that the United States and NATO influenced Ukraine such that Russia had to act in self-defense.
6. General Foreign Policy Attitudes (p. 24)
As in the past, a majority say that common ground and peaceful coexistence are possible between the Islamic world and the West, while four in ten think conflict is inevitable. A majority continues to think that Iran needs a president who will refuse to compromise on Iran’s rights, rather than one who will focus on negotiating. After years of economic hardship, a slight majority now prefers a strategy of trying to increase Iran’s international trade over a strategy of self-sufficiency. As to whether to focus more on European or Asian trade and diplomatic relations, a slight plurality leans toward Europe.
7. The War in Gaza and Relations with Israel (p. 26)
Over four in five have some knowledge of the war in Gaza, and seven in ten think that all countries, including Iran, have a responsibility toward it. Large majorities perceive that Iran provides the Palestinians some aid of various types–political, military, financial and humanitarian–but only four in ten think Iran provides a lot. Fewer than four in ten think Iran should provide a lot, except for food and medicine. A majority feels sure that the United States is the prime decision maker between itself and Israel; yet, between Iran and Hamas, a majority feels that ultimately Hamas makes its own decisions. In March 2024, two-thirds said Iran should not recognize Israel; one quarter said it should, as a route to sanctions relief. Three in five think Iran should support a one-state solution that would include the right of return for Palestinian refugees. A fifth think Iran should support a two-state solution, with Israeli and Palestinian states; a tenth support a single state but with no right of return.
8. Attitudes toward Afghanistan, the Taliban, and Afghan Refugees in Iran (p. 32)
In March 2024, 6 in 10 had a negative view of Afghanistan, but only a third of Iranians held very unfavorable views toward the country as a whole. Iranian attitudes toward the Taliban have been much more negative. Six months after the Taliban regained power in August 2022, nearly 9 in 10 Iranians held a very unfavorable view of them. While a majority opposed Iran working toward diplomatic relations with the Taliban government in March 2023, a third said they would support it. Majorities were also supportive of dialogue with the Taliban to resolve water disputes and address other issues. Almost two-thirds supported offering places in Iranian universities to Afghan women seeking to pursue their education. Two in three express negative views about Iran’s sizeable number of workers who are Afghan refugees, seeing them as taking jobs from Iranians, while one-third view them as simply doing undesirable jobs Iranians will not perform. At the same time, seven in ten support educating Afghan children in Iran’s public school system. Intermarriages between Iranians and Afghans are a related social issue, one in which Iranians’ views are entangled with their views of gender. Majorities think there should be some governmental review before such marriages are permitted–but more would allow an Iranian man leeway than would allow it for an Iranian woman. Similarly, for Iranian birth certificates for the children of these unions, a majority would support these if the man in the couple were Iranian– but not if the woman in the couple were Iranian.
9. Regional Security (p. 36)
A quarter of Iranians now say that if they could change only one thing about Iran, they would make it more “safe and secure,” almost twice as many as prioritized security six months earlier. While a majority thinks that Iran should increase its role in the Middle East further, this is down from five years ago. The majority that disagrees with calls for the government to spend less money in places like Syria and Iraq was nearly identical in March 2024 as it had been in January 2018, before then-President Trump withdrew from the 2015 nuclear deal and began his “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign. Attitudes toward Saudi Arabia have thawed somewhat, though a majority still is unfavorable toward it. Among non-state actors in the Middle East, majorities of Iranians were favorable toward Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis as of March 2024. Support for Iran’s missile program remains nearly unanimous, and a large and growing majority disagrees with calls to spend less money on developing missiles. A majority still opposes Iran pursuing nuclear weapons, but the number of supporters has increased since the war in Gaza began. Seven in ten believe that violations of Iranian waters or airspace should be punished, rather than Iran attempting to avoid escalation, a somewhat more cautious stance than before.
10. Iran’s Nuclear Program (p. 38)
For the first time since 2008, the Iranian public is divided about whether to develop both atomic bombs and nuclear power, or to develop nuclear power alone. Support for developing nuclear weapons rose slightly after the war in Gaza began, but in March 2024 a majority still rejected nuclear weapons. Those who prefer having both atomic weapons and nuclear energy rose again in October after Israel and Iran intensified their attacks on each other, such that there is now no majority against development of nuclear weapons. Among those who favored an Iranian atomic bomb in March 2024, about two in three said they want nuclear weapons to deter threats from other countries, including those with nuclear arms. Most Iranians said then that the influence of the Gaza war either did not affect their nuclear views or made them more favorable toward the idea of developing a nuclear weapon. As in the past, two-thirds supported a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. While a majority still said in 2023 that developing nuclear weapons is against Islam’s teachings (without being reminded that this is the official position), this majority had eroded significantly since 2014. Awareness of Iran’s membership in the Non-Proliferation Treaty is also much lower than in the past. After being reminded that Iran has made a legal commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, only four in ten were willing in March 2024 to leave the NPT if their leaders decided Iran should develop nuclear weapons. If Iran’s leaders decided to make nuclear weapons, a large and growing majority said their country would succeed, even though about two-thirds expected that the United States and other countries would take actions to stop Iran, military and otherwise. If the United States were to conduct an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, four in five would want to rebuild them; three in five would also want to expand Iran’s nuclear activities.
11. Negotiated Constraints on Iran’s Nuclear Program (p. 44)
As of March 2024, more still approved than disapproved of the JCPOA, even though there had been no talks about the United States and Iran returning to full compliance for a year and a half. Acknowledgement of sanctions’ negative impact, especially on ordinary people, was almost unanimous, but Iranians still attributed their country’s economic problems more to internal mismanagement and corruption than to external sanctions. Three quarters thought that a full restoration of the JCPOA would help Iran’s economy. A growing majority in 2023 expected there would be no restoration of the JCPOA. A majority thought it best to let the Europeans seek some flexibility from the United States, rather than Iran showing more flexibility on its own side. Yet, seven in ten were upset to see the negotiations suspended by Western powers after the 2022 protests in Iran. If the negotiations were to end without agreement, Iranians felt they would allocate more blame to the P5+1, but less than one in five would give them the full blame. Three in ten would blame both sides equally. By October 2024, the focus of diplomatic efforts had shifted from restoring full compliance with the JCPOA to negotiating more limited constraints on Iran’s nuclear program in return for partial sanctions relief. Asked to consider hypothetical future agreements, a bare majority reject a possible confidence-building measure in which Iran would resume allowing the IAEA fuller access while the United States and Europe would let Iran recover its frozen money held in foreign countries. However, three in five would support a deal in which Iran would accept limitations and greater transparency in its nuclear program, and in return would gain the ability to sell its oil abroad with full access to the proceeds. A majority thinks such a deal between the United States and Iran is unlikely. If it came about, only a third think the United States would fulfill its side of the agreement.
12. International Trade and Views of China, Russia, Germany and Britain (p. 47)
In October 2024 for the first time, a majority preferred the goal of increased international trade over that of economic self-sufficiency. A slight plurality preferred to do more to increase trade with Western, rather than Eastern partners–a shift from their earlier preference for increasing trade with Asia. A growing majority was negative toward Russia by March 2024, while a small majority was positive toward China. Choice of terms to describe Iran’s relationship with China in 2023 were almost identical to those applied to Russia: slightly over 1 in 10 called both countries “allies,” while about a third called them “friends,” and 3 in 10 picked a neutral description. In 2023 a slight majority had an unfavorable view of Germany, and a large majority felt negatively about Britain. Two years after Iran and China signed a 25-year trade agreement in 2021, over three in five thought this cooperation was in Iran’s interest, while only three in ten were worried by China’s recent expansion of ties with Saudi Arabia.
13. The War in Ukraine as of 2023 (p. 50)
In 2023, four in five would have preferred that Iran not get itself involved in the war in Ukraine, but the public was divided on arms sales to Russia, and there was no majority view about what Iran was in fact doing. A slim plurality thought selling drones to Russia was in Iran’s national interest, while almost four in ten disagreed. A slight majority were willing to sell weapons to Russia, at least under some conditions. Offered a hypothetical bargain in which Iran would stop selling Russian weapons in exchange for partial relaxation of sanctions on oil sales, a slim plurality approved. Fewer than one in ten blamed Ukraine itself for the war. About a third blamed Russia, while a third blamed the United States, Western countries, or Europe. A quarter appeared unsure–more than in 2022. Favorability toward Ukraine had dropped to four in ten, while favorability toward Russia was slightly lower than toward Ukraine. A majority remained unreceptive to the Russian argument that Russia was acting in self-defense against U.S. and NATO influence in Ukraine.