The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in-depth surveys of Iranian public opinion on nuclear issues, regional security, economics, domestic politics, and other topics since the summer of 2014. This report probes attitudes in late September and early October 2025, a few months after the June 2025 Twelve-Day War. This survey found notable signs of the "rally-round-the-flag effect" that many observers were commenting on at that time, including very positive appraisals of some aspects of their government’s and military’s performance during the war. The findings also include multiple indicators of political and economic discontent, but these measures were largely unchanged from the previous year.
Much of the report covers attitudes towards Iran’s nuclear program in the context of broader views on national security. Three-quarters held that President Trump used negotiations with Iran to buy time while Israel and the United States prepared to attack Iran. Large majorities maintained that their military fought back successfully during the Twelve-Day War when no other country provided meaningful assistance. Support for Iran’s missile program has hit a record high, and for the first time, a slim majority of Iranians favored having a nuclear deterrent, not just a peaceful nuclear program. Attitudes regarding the possibilities of more military strikes, tougher sanctions, and further negotiations with the United States indicated both continued resistance to coercion, and some openness to compromise if given credible reassurance.
View the questionnaire and trend table.
Summary of Report Findings
Majorities in Iran did not see the Twelve-Day War in June as a defeat but instead said their country effectively defended itself and withstood the attacks. Nine in ten said the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' effort to punish Israeli attacks by firing missiles into Israel was successful. Four in five thought Iran’s government succeeded in preventing food and fuel shortages during the war.
The view that Israel began the war with the intention of provoking regime change in Iran was by far the most popular explanation of the war, with more than four in five accepting it.
Four in five saw the United States as starting the war, believing that without U.S. encouragement, Israel would not have attacked. This reflects Iranians’ general attitude about the U.S.-Israel relationship. Half thought that the United States and Israel make important decisions together, with the former mostly getting the final say. Three-quarters believed that the United States used negotiations to buy time to prepare for war.
In October, Iranians were generally positive about most aspects of government performance during the war. Over four in five thought Iran’s government succeeded in preventing food and fuel shortages during the war and applauded punishing missile attacks on Israel. Almost as many considered the intelligence and security services efforts at least somewhat successful. Assessments of air defense efforts were mixed.
Large majorities maintained that the ceasefire happened relatively quickly because Iran imposed high costs on Israel, could have closed the Strait of Hormuz if the war continued, and convinced Israel and the United States that the war was not achieving their objectives. A bare majority thought neighboring countries played an important role, while about a third said that Israel and the United States accomplished their war aims.
In October, Iranians had widely varying expectations about how long the current peace would last. A slight majority said it was at least somewhat likely that war would reignite in the next few weeks. An additional 1 in 10 thought this might happen in the next 12 months. A little over a third thought resumption of the war unlikely, at least within the next twelve months.
The war did not seem to impact the public’s negative view of the economy one way or the other. Seven in ten said the general economic situation is bad. As in the past, three in five saw domestic mismanagement and corruption as a stronger negative factor than sanctions. The number who named that prospect or sanctions as the top problem facing their country was dwarfed by those who cited some internal economic challenge.
While about half of the respondents thought that possible new sanctions from the United States could greatly worsen Iran’s economy, the other half believed that the United States had already sanctioned Iran to the fullest extent possible. Only one in five favored accepting EU demands to prevent the reimposition of United Nations sanctions. Three-quarters thought Iran should receive assurances that its nuclear program would not be attacked again before considering accepting EU demands.
Attitudes toward President Pezeshkian were as positive in October 2025 as they were in the honeymoon period right after he took office. Almost two-thirds regarded him favorably, and majorities remained confident he could advance most aspects of his agenda. Roughly half trusted the authorities of the Islamic Republic. Three-quarters of respondents still want policymakers to take religious teachings into account. However, two-thirds of respondents said that women who do not observe hijab should not be confronted.
Six in ten respondents viewed the economy, or aspects of it, as Iran’s greatest challenge, even after the war experience. A plurality of Iranians still prioritized economic improvement over other types of change, but a quarter wanted greater national security above all else.
Iranian attitudes on security hardened further after the Twelve-Day War. Seven in ten thought Iran must become much better armed. Only a quarter said that the war showed Iran cannot defend itself against major aggression and should make difficult concessions. A majority thought that when Israel struck its air defenses in October 2024, Iran should have responded militarily instead of showing restraint. Four in five said Iran should punish the perpetrators whenever there is evidence of a violation of Iran’s territory and that it was very important to develop Iran’s missile program.
For the first time, a slim majority wanted to “develop both atomic bombs and nuclear power.” Four in five wanted to rebuild the program after the U.S. bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities. Two-thirds of respondents anticipated it would take two years or less for Iran to acquire nuclear weapons if its leaders decided to do so. Three in five expected the United States and other countries to take military action against Iran if it withdrew from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). Seven in ten favored the idea of Iran joining a consortium for the Middle East and North Africa, in which member states would reject nuclear weapons, share facilities, and verify members' use of nuclear technology solely for peaceful purposes.
Half maintained that Iran should not resume nuclear negotiations until it becomes confident that the United States really seeks a mutually beneficial agreement; an additional three in ten required credible assurances that Iran would not be attacked again. A majority thought that new requirements, like those in the 2015 Nuclear Deal, expiring in a given number of years, could be acceptable. Half were willing to negotiate the end of support for Hamas, Hezbollah, and other groups, depending on circumstances. However, most respondents viewed permanent limits on Iran's nuclear program, an end to uranium enrichment, or a reduction in the range of ballistic missiles as unacceptable. Seven in ten considered sanctions relief with a step-by-step structure to ensure that Iran gets benefits in return for concessions as necessary components of an acceptable deal.
A growing majority of respondents viewed climate change as a serious problem, but only half thought scientists viewed it as urgent, and that action against it is possible. Seven in ten expected unchecked climate change to strongly affect Iran’s food prices, the likelihood of natural disasters, and water resources. Three in five were personally affected by water shortages in 2025. Three in five wanted the government to prioritize the environment, even when it conflicted with economic growth, and to take steps to curb climate change, despite the costs. Awareness of international agreements on climate change, such as the Paris Agreement, has declined.
There was no indication in October 2025 that collectively, Iranians had grown more discouraged about their individual lives. On a scale of 0 to 10, only one in five gave their life a rating of 3 or below, fewer than the three in ten who did so in 2021. A clear majority saw themselves as being in the middle of the well-being scale. Looking ahead five years, three in four had expectations for their lives that were middling to good, more than in 2021.